In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic
Authors
Bernard Linsky and Edward N. Zalta
Reference
Philosophical Perspectives, 8, 1994,
431-458
Abstract
The simplest quantified modal logic combines classical quantification
theory with the propositional modal logic K. The models of simple QML
relativize predication to possible worlds and treat the quantifier as
ranging over a single fixed domain of objects. But this simple QML
has features that are objectionable to actualists. By contrast,
Kripke-models, with their varying domains and restricted quantifiers,
seem to eliminate these features. But in fact, Kripke-models also
have features to which actualists object. Though these philosophers
have introduced variations on Kripke-models to eliminate their
objectionable features, the most well-known variations all have
difficulties of their own. The present authors reexamine simple QML
and discover that, in addition to having a possibilist interpretation,
it has an actualist interpretation as well. By introducing a new sort
of existing abstract entity, the contingently nonconcrete, they show
that the seeming drawbacks of the simplest QML are not drawbacks at
all. Thus, simple QML is independent of certain metaphysical
questions.
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