

Mechanizing *Principia Logico-Metaphysica* in Functional Type Theory*

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Abstract

Principia Logico-Metaphysica contains a foundational logical theory for metaphysics, mathematics, and the sciences. It includes a canonical development of Abstract Object Theory [AOT], a metaphysical theory (inspired by ideas of Ernst Mally, formalized by Zalta) that distinguishes between ordinary and abstract objects.

This article reports on recent work in which AOT has been successfully represented and partly automated in the proof assistant

system Isabelle/HOL. Initial experiments within this framework reveal a crucial but overlooked fact: a deeply-rooted and known paradox is reintroduced in AOT when the logic of complex terms is simply adjoined to AOT's specially formulated comprehension principle for relations. This result constitutes a new and important paradox, given how much expressive and analytic power is contributed by having the two kinds of complex terms in the system. Its discovery is the highlight of our joint project and provides strong evidence for a new kind of scientific practice in philosophy, namely, *computational metaphysics*.

Our results were made technically possible by a suitable adaptation of Benz Müller's metalogical approach to universal reasoning by semantically embedding theories in classical higher-order logic. This approach enables one to reuse state-of-the-art higher-order proof assistants, such as Isabelle/HOL, for mechanizing and experimentally exploring challenging logics and theories such as AOT. Our results also provide a fresh perspective on the question of whether relational type theory or functional type theory better serves as a foundation for logic and metaphysics.

1 Abstract Summary

Principia Logico-Metaphysica (PLM) [16] is an online research monograph that contains a canonical presentation of Abstract Object Theory (AOT) [17], [18], along with motivation for, and commentary on, the theory. AOT is a foundational logical theory for metaphysics, mathematics and the sciences. It distinguishes between abstract and ordinary objects, by regimenting a distinction found in the work of the philosopher Ernst Mally [7] (though the distinction has appeared in other philosophical works).

AOT is outlined in §2. It systematizes two fundamental kinds of predication: classical exemplification for ordinary and abstract objects, and *encoding* for abstract objects. The latter is a new kind of predication that provides AOT with expressive power beyond that of quantified second-order modal logic, and this enables one to formalize various metaphysical theories about different abstract objects, including the objects presupposed by mathematics and the sciences. More generally, the system offers a universal logical theory that may have a greater capability of accurately representing the contents of human thought than other foundational systems.

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Independently, the use of *shallow semantical embeddings* (SSEs) of complex logical systems in classical higher-order logic (HOL) has consistently shown potential as a metalogical approach towards universal logical reasoning [1]. The SSE approach aims to unify logical reasoning by using HOL as a universal metalogic. Only the distinctive primitives of a target logic are defined in the metalogic in terms of their semantic interpretations, whereas the rest of the target system is captured by the existing infrastructure of HOL. This is why it is a *shallow* semantical embedding. For example, quantified modal logic can be encoded by representing propositions as sets of possible worlds and by representing the connectives, quantifiers, and modal operators as operations on those sets. In this way, the world-dependency of Kripke-style semantics can easily be modeled in HOL. Utilizing the variety of options for handling and hiding such definitions that are offered in modern proof assistants such as Isabelle/HOL [12], a human-friendly mechanization of even the most challenging target logics, including AOT, can thus be obtained.

AOT and the SSE approach are rather orthogonal. They have very different motivations and come with fundamentally different foundational assumptions. AOT uses a *hyperintensional second-order modal logic*, grounded on a *relational type theory*, as its foundation. It is in the tradition of Whitehead and Russell’s *Principia Mathematica* [14], [10] which takes the notion of *relation* as primitive and defines the notion of *function* in terms of relations. Relations, on this approach, are assumed to be hyperintensional unless one explicitly asserts, of a given n -place relation R , that it is extensional by adding an axiom that guarantees that any n -place relation necessarily equivalent to R is identical to it, i.e., that $\forall S(\Box\forall x_1 \dots \forall x_n(Sx_1 \dots x_n \equiv Rx_1 \dots x_n) \rightarrow S=R)$. The metalogic HOL in the SSE approach, by contrast, is fully extensional, and is defined on top of a functional type theory in the tradition of the work of Frege [6] and Church [4]. It takes the notion of (fully extensional) *function* as primitive and defines the notion of *relation* in terms of functions.¹ These fundamentally different and, to some extent, antagonistic roots impose different requirements on the corresponding frameworks, in particular, with regard to the comprehension principles that assert the existence of relations and functions. Devising a mapping between the two formalisms

¹In principle, functional type theory can be developed intensionally [11], but Isabelle/HOL and other automated proof assistants are based on extensional functional type theory for a reason, namely, to make the system computationally tractable.

is, unsurprisingly, a non-trivial, practical challenge [13].

The work reported here tackles this challenge. Further details can be found in Kirchner’s M.A. thesis [8], where the SSE approach is utilized to mechanize and analyze AOT in HOL. Kirchner constructed a shallow semantical embedding of the second-order modal fragment of AOT in HOL, and this embedding was subsequently represented in the proof assistant system Isabelle/HOL (see §4). The proof assistant system enables one to conduct experiments in the spirit of a *computational metaphysics*, with results that have helped to advance the ideas of AOT.

The inspiration for Kirchner’s embedding comes from the model for AOT proposed by Peter Aczel.² Kirchner adapted techniques used in Benz Müller’s initial attempts to embed AOT in Isabelle/HOL. An important goal of the research was to avoid *artifactual theorems*, i.e., theorems that (a) are derivable on the basis of special facts about the Aczel model that was used to embed AOT in Isabelle/HOL, but (b) aren’t theorems of AOT.³ An example of an artifactual theorem can be seen in Figure 6 and, since AOT is, in part, a body of theorems, care has been taken not to derive artifactual theorems about the Aczel model that are not theorems of AOT itself.

This explains why the embedding of AOT in Isabelle/HOL involves several layers of abstraction. In the Aczel model of AOT that serves as a starting point, abstract objects are modeled as sets of properties, where properties are themselves modeled as sets of urelements. Once the axioms of AOT are derived from the shallow semantical embedding of AOT in HOL, a controlled, and suitably restricted, logic layer is defined. By reconstructing the inference principles of AOT in the system that derives the axioms of AOT, only the theorems of AOT become derivable. If we utilize Isabelle/HOL’s sophisticated support tools for interactive and automated proof development at this highest level of the embedding, it becomes straightforward to map the pen and paper proofs of PLM into corresponding, intuitive, and user-friendly proofs in Isabelle/HOL. In nearly all cases this mapping is roughly one-to-one, and in several cases the computer proofs are even shorter. In other words, the *de Bruijn factor*

²An earlier model for AOT was proposed by Dana Scott. His model is equivalent to a special case of an Aczel model with only one *special urelement*. See below for a discussion of the Aczel model.

³We have not yet investigated the question of whether the embedding of AOT in HOL is complete in the sense that if the representation of ϕ is provable in HOL, then ϕ is provable in AOT. However, this will be a topic of future research.

[15] of this work is close to 1. In addition, the layered construction of the embedding has yielded a detailed, experimental analysis in Isabelle/HOL of the underlying Aczel model and the semantic properties of AOT.

As an unexpected, but key result of this experimental study, it was discovered that if a classical logic for complex terms such as λ -expressions and definite descriptions is adjoined, without taking any special precautions, to AOT's specially-formulated comprehension principle for relations, a known paradox that had been successfully put to rest is reintroduced (see §5). Since the complex terms add significant expressive and analytic power to AOT, and play a role in many of its more interesting theorems and applications, the re-emergence of the known paradox has become a *new* paradox that has to be addressed. In the ongoing attempts to find an elegant formulation of AOT that avoids the new paradox, the computational representation in Isabelle/HOL now provides a testing infrastructure and serves as an invaluable aid for analyzing various conjectures and hypothetical solutions to the problem. This illustrates the very idea of *computational metaphysics*: humans and machines team up and split the tedious work in proportion to their cognitive and computational strengths and competencies. And, as intended, the results we achieved reconfirm the practical relevance of the SSE approach to universal logical reasoning.

Though the details of the embedding of AOT in Isabelle/HOL are developed in Kirchner [8], we discuss the core aspects of this work in the remainder of this article.

2 The Theory of Abstract Objects

The language of second-order AOT uses individual variables x, y, \dots and n -place relation variables F^n, G^n, \dots ($n \geq 0$). The sentences of the language are built up from two kinds of atomic formulas: classical *exemplification* formulas of the form F^1x (or more generally, $F^n x_1 \dots x_n$) and *encoding* formulas of the form xF^1 .⁴ A distinguished predicate is then used to define a distinction between objects that exemplify *being abstract*

⁴It is important to emphasize that the two kinds of atomic formulas are *typed* in the sense that, in both kinds of formulas, no individual term can stand in relation position and no relation term can stand in individual position. In the embedding of this language in functional type theory both kinds of formulas are given a special functional semantics that is distinct from the fundamental notion of function application in HOL. Details of this semantics can be found in §4.

($A!x$) and objects that exemplify *being ordinary* ($O!x$). Whereas ordinary objects are characterized only by the properties they exemplify, abstract objects may be characterized by both the properties they exemplify and the properties they encode. But only the latter play a role in their identity conditions: $A!x \ \& \ A!y \rightarrow (x = y \equiv \Box \forall F(xF \equiv yF))$, i.e., abstract objects are identical if and only if they necessarily encode the same properties. The identity for ordinary objects on the other hand is classical: $O!x \ \& \ O!y \rightarrow (x = y \equiv \Box \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy))$, i.e., ordinary objects x and y are identical if and only if they necessarily exemplify the same properties. It is axiomatic that ordinary objects necessarily fail to encode properties ($O!x \rightarrow \Box \neg \exists FxF$), and so only abstract objects can be the subject of true encoding predications. For example, whereas Pinkerton (a real American detective) exemplifies *being a detective* and all his other properties (and doesn't encode any properties), Sherlock Holmes encodes *being a detective* (and all the other properties attributed to him in the novels), but doesn't exemplify *being a detective*. Holmes, on the other hand, intuitively exemplifies *being a fictional character* (but doesn't encode this property) and exemplifies any property necessarily implied by *being abstract* (e.g., he exemplifies *not having a mass, not having a shape*, etc.).⁵

The key axiom of AOT is the comprehension principle for abstract objects. It asserts, for every condition on properties (i.e., for every expressible set of properties), that there exists an abstract object that encodes exactly the properties that satisfy the condition; formally:

$$\exists x(A!x \ \& \ \forall F(xF \equiv \phi)),$$

where ϕ is any condition on F in which x doesn't occur free. Therefore, abstract objects can be modeled as elements of the power set of properties: every abstract object uniquely corresponds to a specific set of properties.

Given this basic theory of abstract objects, AOT can define a wide variety of objects that have been postulated in philosophy or presupposed in the sciences, including truth-values, Leibnizian concepts, Platonic forms, possible worlds, natural numbers, and logically-defined sets.

Another interesting aspect of the theory is its hyperintensionality. Relation identity is defined in terms of encoding rather than in terms of exemplification. Two properties F and G are stipulated to be identical

⁵He encodes *having a mass, having a shape*, etc., since these are properties attributed to him, at least implicitly, in the story. As an abstract object, however, he does *not* exemplify these properties, and so exemplifies their negations.

if they are necessarily *encoded* by the same abstract objects ($F = G \equiv \Box \forall x(xF \equiv xG)$). However, the theory does not impose any restrictions on the properties encoded by a particular abstract object. For example, the fact that an abstract object encodes the property $[\lambda x Fx \ \& \ Gx]$ does not imply that it also encodes either the property F , or G or even $[\lambda x Gx \ \& \ Fx]$ (which, although extensionally equivalent to $[\lambda x Fx \ \& \ Gx]$, is a distinct intensional entity).

Therefore, without additional axioms, pairs of materially equivalent properties (in the exemplification sense), and even necessarily equivalent properties, are not forced to be identical. This is a key aspect of the theory that makes it possible to represent the contents of human thought much more accurately than classical exemplification logic would allow. For instance, the properties *being a creature with a heart* and *being a creature with a kidney* may be regarded as distinct properties despite the fact that they are extensionally equivalent. And *being a barber who shaves all and only those persons who don't shave themselves* and *being a set of all those sets that aren't members of themselves* may be regarded as distinct properties, although they are necessarily equivalent (both necessarily fail to be exemplified).

A full description of the theory goes beyond the scope of this article, but detailed descriptions are available in two books [17], [18] and various articles by Zalta. A regularly updated, online monograph titled *Principia Logico-Metaphysica* [16] contains the latest formulation of the theory and serves to compile, in one location, both new theorems and theorems from many of the published books and articles. The mechanization described below follows the presentation of AOT in a recent version of PLM, but is still being adapted as research continues and PLM evolves.

The complexity and versatility of AOT, as well as its philosophical ambitions, make it an ideal candidate to test the universality of the SSE approach. However, recent work [13] has posed a challenge for any embedding of AOT in functional type theory. In the next section, we briefly discuss this challenge.

3 AOT in Functional Logic

Russell's well-known paradox in naive set theory arises by (a) considering the set of all sets that don't contain themselves, and (b) noting that this set contains itself if and only if it doesn't. A similar construction

(‘the Clark-Boolos paradox’) is possible in naive versions of AOT: assume that the term $[\lambda x \exists F(xF \ \& \ \neg Fx)]$ denotes a property, namely, being an x that encodes a property that x does not exemplify; call it K . The comprehension axiom for abstract objects then ensures that there is an abstract object that encodes K and no other properties. This abstract object then exemplifies K if and only if it does not, and so involves one in a paradox.⁶ See [3] for details about the paradox; it was first described by Clark [5] and reconstructed independently by Boolos [2].

AOT undermined the paradox by restricting the matrix of λ -expressions to so-called *propositional formulas*, that is, to formulas without encoding subformulas. This way, the term $[\lambda x \exists F(xF \ \& \ \neg Fx)]$ is no longer well formed and the construction of the paradox fails. Thus, AOT contained formulas, e.g., $\exists F(xF \ \& \ \neg Fx)$, that may *not* be placed within a λ -expression or otherwise converted to a term.⁷

Whereas relational type theory allows one to have formulas that cannot be converted to terms, functional type theory does not; in functional type theory, it is assumed that every formula can be converted to a term. That is crucial to the analysis of the universal quantifier. The binding operator $\forall x$ in a formula of the form $\forall x\phi$ is represented, in functional type theory, as a function that maps the *property* $[\lambda x \phi]$ to a truth value, namely, the function that maps $[\lambda x \phi]$ to The True just in case every object y in the domain is such that $[\lambda x \phi](y)$ holds. So in order to represent quantified AOT formulas that contain encoding subformulas, such as $\forall x \exists F(xF \ \& \ \neg Fx)$, their matrices have to be convertible to terms.⁸ But, as we've seen, if $[\lambda x \exists F(xF \ \& \ \neg Fx)]$ were a term subject to β -conversion,

⁶Let a be the abstract object guaranteed by object comprehension, so that we know:

$$(\vartheta) \ \forall F(aF \equiv F = K)$$

Now suppose, for reductio, Ka . Then by β -conversion, there is a property, say P , such that $aP \ \& \ \neg Pa$. Since aP , it follows by (ϑ) that $P = K$. So from $\neg Pa$ it follows that $\neg Ka$, which contradicts our reductio hypothesis. So suppose $\neg Ka$. Then by β -conversion and predicate logic, $\forall F(aF \rightarrow Fa)$. Now since $K = K$, it follows from (ϑ) that aK . Hence Ka . Contradiction.

⁷In the very latest versions of PLM, AOT's free logic has been extended to cover λ -expressions, and so $[\lambda x \exists F(xF \ \& \ \neg Fx)]$ is now treated as well formed but *non-denoting*. This latest development is briefly discussed in [9].

⁸Note that $\forall x \exists F(xF \ \& \ \neg Fx)$ is a well-formed formula of the system, but in fact false. For example, it fails when x is ordinary, and when x is the abstract object that encodes no properties. However, the negation of this formula is true, and our question is how to *interpret* the embedded quantifier in functional type theory.

AOT would yield a contradiction.⁹

Thus, it is not trivial to devise a semantical embedding that supports AOT's distinction between formulas and propositional formulas, but at the same time preserves a general theory of quantification. Another challenge has been to accurately represent the hyperintensionality of AOT: while relations in AOT are hyperintensional (i.e., necessarily equivalent relations may be distinct), functions (and relations) in HOL are fully extensional, and can not be used to represent the relations of AOT directly.

4 Embedding AOT in Isabelle/HOL

The embedding of AOT in Isabelle/HOL overcomes these issues by constructing a modal, hyperintensional variant of the Aczel-model of AOT. Modality is represented by introducing a dependency on primitive possible worlds in the manner of Kripke semantics of modal logic. Hyperintensionality is achieved by an additional dependency on a separate domain of primitive *states*. Consequently, propositions are represented as Boolean-valued functions acting on states and possible worlds. The model begins with a domain partitioned into ordinary and *special* urelements (this corresponds to the domain \mathbf{U} in Figure 1). Whereas the Aczel model represents properties as sets of urelements, properties in our embedding are represented as functions mapping urelements to propositions. The ordinary objects of AOT are then represented by ordinary urelements, and the abstract objects of AOT are represented as sets of properties. These sets are assigned a proxy among the *special* urelements (and given that there are more sets of properties than urelements, some abstract objects will be assigned the same proxy).¹⁰

⁹Readers familiar with Isabelle/HOL might find this notation confusing. In AOT, the symbol ϕ is a metavariable that ranges over formulas which may contain free occurrences of x that can be bound by a binding operator. In Isabelle/HOL, however, a formula with a free variable would be represented as a function from individuals to truth-values, and the quantified formula would be written as $\forall x. \phi x$. Such a formula is true, if ϕx , i.e., the function application of ϕ to x holds for all x in the domain. In this scenario it is true that $\phi = (\lambda x. \phi x)$. Consequently the primitive, functional λ -expressions of Isabelle/HOL cannot be used to represent the λ -expressions of AOT, since the λ -expressions of Isabelle/HOL cannot simultaneously exclude non-propositional formulas while allowing quantified formulas with encoding subformulas.

¹⁰The problem that Aczel solves in the model is this: if abstract objects are represented as sets of properties, then how are we to understand the fact that in object theory, there is an object x and property F such that both xF and Fx ? The encoding




Figure 1: Extensional, non-modal Aczel model of AOT.

From this description, it becomes clear that if x is an ordinary object, then the truth conditions of an exemplification formula Px are captured by the proposition that is the result of applying the function representing the property P to the ordinary urelement representing x . If x is an abstract object, then the truth conditions of an exemplification formula Px are captured by the proposition that is the result of applying the function representing the property P to the *special* urelement that serves as the proxy of x . An encoding formula xP , by contrast, is true just in case x is an abstract object and the property P is an element of the set of properties representing x . This latter feature of the model validates the comprehension axiom for abstract objects: for every set of properties, there exists a unique abstract object that encodes exactly those prop-

claim, xF , is easy: in the model, this is true if $F \in x$. However, how can a set of properties *exemplify* a property that is an element of it? We cannot model Fx as $x \in F$ without a violation of the foundation axiom. Interestingly, Aczel chose *not* to use nonwellfounded sets for his model. Instead he mapped abstract objects, modeled as sets of properties, to proxies in the domain of special urelements and set the truth conditions for Fx to the following disjunctive condition: $x \in F$ if x is ordinary and $\|x\| \in F$ (i.e., the proxy of x is an element of F), if x is abstract. We have extended Aczel's model with modality and hyperintensionality.

erties. Figure 2 shows the representation of 1-place exemplification and encoding in Isabelle/HOL.

```
lift_definition exe1 :: " $\Pi_1 \Rightarrow \kappa \Rightarrow o$ " ("( $\_ , \_$ )") is
  " $\lambda F x s w . (\text{proper } x) \wedge F (\nu\nu (\text{rep } x)) s w$ " .
lift_definition enc :: " $\kappa \Rightarrow \Pi_1 \Rightarrow o$ " ("( $\_ , \_$ )") is
  " $\lambda x F s w . (\text{proper } x) \wedge \text{case\_}\nu (\lambda \omega . \text{False}) (\lambda \alpha . F \in \alpha) (\text{rep } x)$ " .
```

Figure 2: Definition of 1-place exemplification and encoding in Isabelle/HOL.

In the definition of 1-place exemplification, which starts on the first line, `exe1` is defined as a function of type $\Pi_1 \Rightarrow \kappa \Rightarrow o$ that maps 1-place relation terms (of type Π_1) and individual terms (of type κ) to propositions (type o). This function then becomes represented as a 4-argument function that maps properties, individuals, states, and worlds to a Boolean (this function, in turn, is defined by means of `proper`, `rep` and the $\nu\nu$ mappings).¹¹ In the definition of encoding, `enc` is defined as a function of type $\kappa \Rightarrow \Pi_1 \Rightarrow o$ that maps individual terms and 1-place relation terms to propositions. This function then becomes represented as a 4-argument function that maps individuals, properties, states, and worlds to a Boolean (this function, in turn, is defined by means of `proper`, `rep` and a case distinction on types `case_ν`).¹²

Since well-formed λ -expressions in AOT were required to have a propositional matrix, such expressions correspond to functions on urelements. Given that encoding subformulas were excluded from these expressions in AOT, the only formulas that can occur in the matrix of a λ -expression are those built up from exemplification formulas. The truth conditions of these formulas are determined solely by the properties and relations of

¹¹Here `proper x` is true, if x denotes an individual (x can also be a non-denoting definite description), `rep x` is the individual denoted by x (given that x denotes), and $\nu\nu$ is the mapping from individuals to urelements. As a result, the exemplification function maps a property term and an individual term to a proposition that is true in a given intensional state and possible world if and only if the individual term denotes and the property denoted by the property term maps the triple consisting of the urelement corresponding to the denoted individual, the given intensional state, and the given possible world, to The True. For a full description of all types, symbols and concepts involved, refer to [8].

¹²The second conjunct in the definition evaluates to `False`, if `rep x` is an ordinary object; if `rep x` is an abstract object, the conjunct is true if and only if the property F is contained in the abstract object.

the urelements in the model.¹³

Consequently, the λ -expressions of AOT are not represented using the unrestricted primitive λ -expressions of HOL, but have a more complex semantic representation which is captured by the definition of a new class of λ -expressions in Isabelle/HOL that will represent AOT λ -expressions; the definition for the 1-place case is given in Figure 3.

```
lift_definition lambdabinder1 :: " $(\nu \Rightarrow o) \Rightarrow \Pi_1$ " ("binder " $\lambda$ " [8] 9) is
  " $\lambda \varphi . \lambda u s w . \exists x . \nu\nu x = u \wedge \varphi x s w$ " .
```

Figure 3: Definition of AOT's λ -expressions in Isabelle/HOL.

It may help to explain the definition of `lambdabinder1` in Figure 3. `lambdabinder1` is defined as a function of type $(\nu \Rightarrow o) \Rightarrow \Pi_1$, which maps functions-from-individuals-to-propositions to 1-place relation terms. The function φ is mapped to a 1-place relation term, which is in turn represented as a Boolean-valued ternary function on urelements u , states s , and worlds w . This function evaluates to true if there exists an individual x such that both x is mapped to the urelement u under the mapping $\nu\nu$ and the function φ evaluates, for x , to a proposition true in s and w .

Thus, non-well-formed λ -expressions of AOT, which can't be syntactically excluded from the SSE representation, are given a nonstandard semantics and this avoids, modulo the discussion below, the Clark-Boolos paradox. As a result, β -conversion for the *defined* λ -expressions holds in general for terms that were syntactically well-formed in AOT, whereas for terms that were not syntactically well-formed in AOT (but which are still part of the SSE), β -conversion is not derivable.

The model structure we've just described can represent all the terms of the target logic and can preserve hyperintensionality. Moreover, the axioms and inference rules of AOT become derivable. Thus, the embedding makes it possible to introduce additional layers of abstraction. Given the model structure, the first layer of abstraction is the representation of the formal semantics of PLM. This, in turn, becomes the basis of the second layer of abstraction, namely, the derived axioms and the fundamental inference rules of PLM. The second abstraction layer consists solely of the axioms and rules of PLM itself and makes it possible to reason directly

¹³It turns out that in the October 28, 2016 version of *PLM*, there was an exception to this rule that led to the reintroduction of the Clark-Boolos paradox. We'll discuss this in a subsequent section.

in the target logic but independently of the underlying model structure. Thus, the second layer of abstraction avoids the derivation of artifactual theorems; the fact that the model structure validates formulas that aren't theorems of AOT is of no further consequence. And, just as importantly, the model guarantees that the system of AOT is sound.

These results are illustrated in the following figures. In Figure 4, we show the derivation of some axioms; in Figure 5, we show the derivation of the \diamond version of the Barcan formula; and in Figure 6, we show that the derivation of the artifactual theorem $xF \leftrightarrow F \in x$ requires one to unfold the semantic definitions (this is revealed by the second line).

```

Lemma pl_1[axiom]:
  "[[ $\varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$ ]]"
  by axiom_meta_solver
Lemma pl_2[axiom]:
  "[[ $(\varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \chi)) \rightarrow ((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \chi))$ ]]]"
  by axiom_meta_solver
Lemma pl_3[axiom]:
  "[[ $(\neg\varphi \rightarrow \neg\psi) \rightarrow ((\neg\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow \varphi)$ ]]]"
  by axiom_meta_solver

```

Figure 4: Some of the axioms of AOT, derived automatically in Isabelle/HOL.

Furthermore, there are other advantages to our methodology. For one thing, it is straightforward to convert statements derived within Isabelle/HOL into traditional pen and paper proofs for AOT. Thus, our approach facilitates experimental studies within the computational implementation and informs discussions about them. Moreover, the approach is suitable for conducting a deeper analysis of AOT and its model structure. The analysis led to the discovery of how a previously-known paradox could easily resurface if care isn't taken in the formulation of PLM. This paradox will be sketched in the next section.

5 Reintroduction of a Paradox

As explained in the previous section, our goal was to ensure that all of the λ -expressions of the embedding that conformed to AOT's syntactic restrictions have a standard semantics. We wanted β -conversion to govern all λ -expressions with a propositional matrix.

```

Lemma BFs_3[PLM]:
  "[ $\diamond(\exists \alpha. \varphi \alpha) \rightarrow (\exists \alpha. \diamond(\varphi \alpha))$  in  $\mathbf{v}$ ]"
  proof -
    have "[ $(\forall \alpha. \Box(\neg(\varphi \alpha))) \rightarrow \Box(\forall \alpha. \neg(\varphi \alpha))$  in  $\mathbf{v}$ ]"
      using BF by metis
    hence 1: "[ $(\neg(\Box(\forall \alpha. \neg(\varphi \alpha)))) \rightarrow (\neg(\forall \alpha. \Box(\neg(\varphi \alpha))))$  in  $\mathbf{v}$ ]"
      using contraposition_1 by simp
    have 2: "[ $\diamond(\neg(\forall \alpha. \neg(\varphi \alpha))) \rightarrow (\neg(\forall \alpha. \Box(\neg(\varphi \alpha))))$  in  $\mathbf{v}$ ]"
      apply (PLM_subst_method " $\neg(\forall \alpha. \neg(\varphi \alpha))$ " " $\diamond(\neg(\forall \alpha. \neg(\varphi \alpha)))$ ")
      using KBasic2_2 1 by simp+
    have "[ $\diamond(\neg(\forall \alpha. \neg(\varphi \alpha))) \rightarrow (\exists \alpha. \neg(\Box(\neg(\varphi \alpha))))$  in  $\mathbf{v}$ ]"
      apply (PLM_subst_method " $\neg(\forall \alpha. \Box(\neg(\varphi \alpha)))$ " " $\exists \alpha. \neg(\Box(\neg(\varphi \alpha)))$ ")
      using cqt_further_2 apply metis
    using 2 by metis
  thus ?thesis
  unfolding exists_def diamond_def by auto
qed

```

Figure 5: Reasoning in the abstract layer in Isabelle/HOL. Only theorems and rules of AOT are used in derivations.

```

Lemma "[ $\{(\alpha \nu \mathbf{x})^P, F\}$  in  $\mathbf{v}$ ]  $\leftrightarrow F \in \mathbf{x}$ "
  by (simp add: meta_defs meta_aux)

```

Figure 6: Artifactual theorems are provable only by expanding the meta-logical definitions.

However, as we analyzed our work, it became apparent that in the working version of PLM that served as the basis of our investigations, certain λ -expressions involving definite descriptions did not exhibit the desired behavior in the embedding. These were definite descriptions containing a free occurrence of a variable that becomes bound by a λ -binder. We could not verify that β -conversion was derivable for those expressions. Using the infrastructure provided by Isabelle/HOL, it became possible to show that β -conversion for these terms does not hold generally in an Aczel model and this suggested that there might be some problem with these expressions.

Consequently, we focused our attention on the assumption that β -conversion holds for such terms in Isabelle/HOL. This assumption turned out to be inconsistent; the layered structure of the embedding made it possible to construct a proof of the inconsistency using object-level reasoning at the highest level of abstraction. This way, a human-friendly proof of

the paradox was reconstructed and quickly confirmed. It became apparent that the logic of λ -expressions and definite descriptions combined to circumvent the restriction that encoding subformulas not be allowed in λ -expressions. Indeed, the paradox turned out to be one that was previously known (namely, the Clark-Boolos paradox mentioned earlier), but which had re-emerged through the back door (see the discussion below). This new route to a previously-known paradox constituted a new paradox. The new paradox is due in part to the precise definition of *subformula*. The matrix of a λ -expression in AOT was allowed to contain encoding formulas as long as they were *nested within a definite description*. Encoding formulas so nested were not considered subformulas of the matrix and so such matrices were still considered propositional formulas. Therefore, the term $[\lambda x G\iota y\psi]$ was considered well formed even if ψ contained encoding subformulas. By choosing G to be a property that is universally true (e.g. $[\lambda z \forall p(p \rightarrow p)]$) and letting ψ be $y = x \ \& \ \exists F(xF \ \& \ \neg Fx)$, one could construct a property that is extensionally equivalent to the property K described above in Section 3. This was sufficient to reconstruct the Clark-Boolos paradox.

More specifically, to see how the Clark-Boolos paradox was reintroduced, suppose that the following λ -expression denotes a property, for any choice of G :

$$[\lambda x G\iota y(y = x \ \& \ \exists F(xF \ \& \ \neg Fx))]$$

Then if G is a universal property such that $\forall xGx$, it can be shown that

$$\begin{aligned} G\iota y(y = x \ \& \ \exists F(xF \ \& \ \neg Fx)) &\equiv \exists!y(y = x \ \& \ \exists F(xF \ \& \ \neg Fx)) \\ &\equiv \exists F(xF \ \& \ \neg Fx) \end{aligned}$$

We leave the proof as an exercise. So the matrix $G\iota y(y = x \ \& \ \exists F(xF \ \& \ \neg Fx))$ is equivalent to $\exists F(xF \ \& \ \neg Fx)$, when G is a universal property. Although the λ -expression built from the latter matrix was banished from AOT, a λ -expression built from the former matrix would just as easily lead to the Clark-Boolos paradox.

The discovery of the reemergence of the Clark-Boolos paradox has led to some new developments in AOT. There has been a modest revision of the axioms of AOT which avoids the paradox (without sacrificing any important theorems). Indeed, as mentioned earlier in Footnote 7, AOT now allows encoding subformulas in λ -expressions, but its free logic ensures that only the *safe* ones denote properties. These developments also

led to a new definition of *logical existence* for terms, i.e., the fact that a term has a denotation and is thus significant. Typically, in free logic, one defines the logical existence of a term (represented as $\tau\downarrow$) as $\exists\beta(\beta = \tau)$. Object theory had followed this pattern for individual terms. Now, logical existence is (a) defined using exemplification predication instead of using identity for individual terms and (b) also defined for relation terms, this time using encoding predication. These new developments of AOT and its embedding are briefly discussed in [9].

6 Final Considerations

The complexity of the target system and the multiple abstraction layers presents a challenge for the development and use of automated reasoning tools. Normally, one would automate proofs of any embedded theory by using Isabelle/HOL's inbuilt reasoning tools (e.g., Sledgehammer and Nitpick) to unfold the semantical definitions used to represent the theory in HOL. But, in the case of PLM, a better option is to directly automate the proof theory as an abstraction layer, i.e., without unfolding the semantical definitions. We had two reasons for adopting this latter option: it easily avoids the problem of generating artifactual theorems and it allows for the interactive construction of complex, but human-friendly, proofs for PLM. To simplify the implementation of this option, we used the *Eisbach package* of Isabelle to define proof methods for the system PLM, including a resolution prover that can automatically derive the classical propositional tautologies directly in AOT.

One interesting problem that has not yet been resolved is the one identified in Oppenheimer & Zalta [13]. As noted in Section 3, AOT has formulas that can't be converted to denoting terms and this makes it difficult to give a general representation of AOT in functional type theory. Oppenheimer & Zalta concluded from this that relational type theory is more fundamental than functional type theory. But though the SSE embedding of AOT in Isabelle/HOL doesn't challenge this conclusion directly, it does show that the functional setting of HOL can offer a reasonably accurate representation of the reasoning that can be done in AOT. This approach addresses, at least in part, Oppenheimer & Zalta's claim, though we haven't yet addressed whether functional type theory, in the absence of abstraction layers, can generally represent systems of relational type theory in which not every formula can be converted to a

denoting term.

We've discovered that the key to the development of a sound axiomatization of the complex relation terms of AOT is to be found in the study of, and solution to, the representation of λ -expressions. With a paradox-free emendation of AOT, current research is directed to giving an extended analysis of the faithfulness of the embedding approach we used; this would shed further light on the debate about relational and functional type theory. This study should be complemented by an analysis of the reverse direction, i.e., an embedding of the fundamental logic of HOL in the (relational) type-theoretic version of AOT. Both studies should then be carefully assessed.

In conclusion, the semantical embedding approach has been fruitfully employed to encode the logic of AOT in Isabelle/HOL. By devising and utilizing a multi-layered approach (which at the most abstract level directly mechanizes the proof-theoretic system of AOT), the issues arising for an embedding in classical higher-order logic are not too difficult to overcome. A highly complex target system based on a fundamentally different tradition of logical reasoning (relational instead of functional logic) has been represented and analyzed using the approach of shallow semantical embeddings. The power of this approach has been demonstrated by the discovery of a previously unnoticed paradox that was latent in AOT. Furthermore, the work contributes to the philosophical debate about the tension between functional type theory and relational type theory and their inter-representability, and it clearly demonstrates the merits of *shallow semantical embeddings* as a means towards universal logical reasoning.

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